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Abstract
This paper presents the main assumptions of Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s last research
project concerning the logic of synonymity. It shows that the basis of logic of
analytic equivalence, presented in the ﬁrst part of the work, fully corresponds
with these assumptions.
1. Introduction
From the formal point of view, the sentential part of non-Fregean logic
(NFL) is a collection of calculi formulated in the language LSCI of SCI (sen-
tential calculus with identity) and containing the set of SCI theses. In
2011-2012, Andrzej Grzegorczyk designed (in [7] and [8]) a project of sen-
tential logic with a synonymity connective, which may be included in NFL1
Grzegorczyk’s scientiﬁc activity in the last years of his life was focused on
the implementation of this project.
This activity, and the works and discussions it inspired, gave a new
character to certain research related with NFL. In particular, [6] presented
the semantics (in the style of the algebraic semantics by R. Suszko) for
the system marked by the symbol “LD” (Logic of Description) which is
1J. Golin´ska-Pilarek and T. Huuskonen also believe that the logic of synonymity
according to Grzegorczyk can be classified as non-Fregean logic (see [5]).
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the realization of Grzegorczyk’s original metalogical conception. In turn,
in [4] and [5] LD was compared with the system marked as “LE” (Logic of
Equimeaning), which is the last of Grzegorczyk’s metalogical proposals.
The languages of the LD and LE systems are identical; they have four
primary connectives: negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), and
synonimity (≡). The same rules of inference apply in both systems:
(MPLE)
α ≡ β, α
β
(∧1)
α, β
α ∧ β
(∧1)
α ∧ β
α, β
and rule of substitution. The following are LE system axioms.
(Ax0)
LE
¬(p ∧ ¬p)
(Ax1)
LE
p ≡ p
(Ax2)
LE
¬(¬p ≡ p)
(Ax3)
LE
p ≡ (p ∧ p)
(Ax4)
LE
p ≡ (p ∨ p)
(Ax5)
LE
(p ∧ q) ≡ (q ∧ p)
(Ax6)
LE
(p ∨ q) ≡ (q ∨ p)
(Ax7)
LE
(p ∧ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∧ r)
(Ax8)
LE
(p ∨ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ∨ q) ∨ r)
(Ax9)
LE
(p ∧ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r))
(Ax10)
LE
(p ∨ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r))
(Ax11)
LE
¬(p ∧ q) ≡ (¬p ∨ ¬q)
(Ax12)
LE
¬(p ∨ q) ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
(Ax13)
LE
(p ≡ q) ≡ (q ≡ p)
(Ax14)
LE
(p ≡ q) ≡ (¬p ≡ ¬q)
(Ax15)
LE
((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ r)) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (q ≡ r))
(Ax16)
LE
((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (q ∧ r))
(Ax17)
LE
((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (q ∨ r))
The analyses by Joanna Golin´ska-Pilarek and Taneli Huuskonen (in
[5]) show the fact (“At(α)” means below the collection of all sentential
variables occurring in α):
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Fact 1. If ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ LE, then At(α) = At(β).
Proof. Let v be any valuation function. Let hv be the (unique) extension
of this function on LSCI, deﬁned as follows:
(i) hv(p) = 1 iﬀ v(p) = 1,
(ii) hv(¬α) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = 0,
(iii) hv(α ∧ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = hv(β) = 1,
(iv) hv(α ∨ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = 1 or hv(β) = 1,
(v) hv(α ≡ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = hv(β) and At(α) = At(β).
Let us assume that W is a property (of some formulas) deﬁned as fol-
lows: W (α) =df h
v(α) = 1, for every valuation v. Taking into account (ii)-
(iv), each axiom (Ax0)LE−(Ax17)LE has the property W . In the addition
all primitive rules of the LE system preserve this property. Consequently,
the following condition is satisﬁed:
If α ∈ LE, then hv(α) = 1 for every α ∈ LSCI.
In particular:
If ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ LE, then hv(‘α ≡ β’) = 1,
where directly – by (v) – we obtain the Fact. 
According to this fact, the LE system implements one of the key as-
sumptions of the principle of analytic equivalence, whose detailed versions
were formulated (for the given systems of NFL) in [3] and [11]. In this sense,
LE is a system related to the non-Fregean logic of analytic equivalence.
For the LD system, no analogous fact occurs – some of its axioms have
the form ‘α ≡ β’ such that At(α) 6= At(β). For this reason (and also
considering that Grzegorczyk did not prefer this system in the last period
of his activity) LD will not be further examined.
We will call the synonymity connective a connective representing a cer-
tain equivalence relation, whose formal properties are determined by the
logical systems achieving the main assumptions of Grzegorczyk’s project
(which will be shortly further discussed). Within the intuitive interpreta-
tion of the symbol “≡” as a synonymity connective, we accept the rule:
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(E) ‘p ≡ q’ we read: that p means the same as q2.
The purpose of the remaining part of this paper is to systematize the
main assumptions of this project and to compare them with the basis of
logic of analytic equivalence, described in [1], [2], [3], and [11]3.
2. The principles of the logic of synonymity
There is no counterpart to the synonymity connective in standard sentential
logic. In particular, it is not the connective of material equivalence. In
accordance with its meaning, any sentences with the same logical value are
equivalent; this also applies to sentences devoid of any contents connection.
Therefore, the following sentences are true: “2+2 = 4 iff Warsaw is on the
Vistula” (Grzegorczyk’s example), “2 + 2 = 5 iff there are six empty sets”
and so on.
When Grzegorczyk drew attention to this fact, the idea came up to
undertake research whose purpose was: (a) to replace classical sentential
logic (CL) with the alternative logic of synonymity connective, which is a
fragment of CL (plan “A”), or (b) to extend CL with the logic of such a
connective (plan “B”).
Plan “B” is closer to the idea of NFL (built, as we know, on the basis
of CL).
Another, related motive of the work concerning this project was the
need for a formalization of the general concept of description as a language
text in which some properties or relations are assigned to described ob-
jects and that can be formulated using simple sentences in combination
with connectives of negation, conjunction, and disjunction. According to
Grzegorczyk, “human language primarily serves to create descriptions of
reality and logical connectives are its tool” ([9], p. 2; cf. [10], p. 1–4). The
philosophical signiﬁcance of the mentioned connectives is clearly given by
the term “Necessary Descriptive Operators” ([10], p. 5).
In turn, the synonymity operator “comprises a reﬂection of the human
capacity of self-knowledge” which allows the transfer of certain semantic
2This way of reading was applied by Grzegorczyk. The term “perceptive equivalence”
appears in [7] (to describe this connective). Later, Grzegorczyk also used the term
“descriptive equivalence”.
3A characterization of the philosophical and metalogical assumptions of Grzegor-
czyk’s project is also included in the initial excerpts of [5] and [6].
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information on the level of the object language ([8], p. 5). Consequently,
philosophically grounded sentential logic must be “descriptive logic of syn-
onymity”. There are four connectives in its vocabulary: ¬, ∧, ∨, and ≡
([10], p. 11).
The following postulate summarizes the basic assumption of Grzegor-
czyk’s project.
Principle 1 (the weak principle of primitivity of the descriptive connec-
tives and the synonymity connective). Operators of negation, conjunction,
disjunction, and synonymity are primitive constants of logic of synonymity.
The strong version of this principle states that there are no other primi-
tive constants in the language of sentential logic of synonymity than connec-
tives of negation, conjunction, disjunction and synonymity. This version
(towards which Grzegorczyk probably was inclined) will not be applied
here.
Grzegorczyk accepted that sentential logic of synonymity, in addition
to the above principle, should meet two additional principles (the symbol
“γ(p/α)” indicates bellow the formula that results from substituting α for
the variable p in the formula γ).
Principle 2 (the weak principle of extensionality for the synonymity con-
nective, cf. [7], p. 449 and [5], section 7). If formula ‘(α ≡ β)’ is thesis of
logic of synonymity, the thesis of this logic is the formula γ(p/α) ≡ γ(p/β).
The above postulate is distinguished from the strong principle of ex-
tensionality (for the synonymity connective in a given system), claiming
that the thesis of the system is the following formula:
(α ≡ β)→ (γ(p/α) ≡ γ(p/β))
We can easily notice that in any system with the strong principle of
extensionality (and the Modus Ponens), the weak principle of extensionality
is derived.
Fact 2. ([5], Theorem 7.6). The weak principle of extensionality does
not hold for LE4.
4However, this principle holds for LD ([5], Theorem 7.5).
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It turns out that LE – the last of the logical systems proposed by
Grzegorczyk – does not meet the requirements he sets.
Because of that the principle of extensionality is usually used in the
proofs of the normal form theorems (e.g. for CL), LE is unlikely to meet
the next adequacy postulate formulated by Grzegorczyk:
Principle 3 (theorem on the maximum distributive form of description, cf.
[10], p. 15). For any α ∈ CL, formulated only with the help of connectives
of negation, conjunction and disjunction, there is a formula β such that the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) ‘α ≡ β’ is a thesis of logic of synonymity,
(ii) β has the disjunctive normal form.
It is worth noting that in his last notes (cf. [10]), lectures and corre-
spondence concerning his project, Grzegorczyk often expressed the belief
that the theorem on the maximum distributive form of description is a key
test for the adequacy of logic of synonymity.
3. The principle of the truth nature of descriptions
Plan “A” – thus the project of constructing a certain alternative logic in
reference to classical logic - relies on seeking a system that does not require
the so-called paradoxical theorems of CL. Grzegorczyk included among
these the formulas:
(a) (p↔ q) ∨ (p↔ r) ∨ (q ↔ r)5,
(b) q ∨ (p ∨ ¬p)6.
However, attempts to satisfactorily implement this plan faced both
signiﬁcant formal and philosophical diﬃculties. It turned out, for example,
that (b) is a thesis of LD. In addition, many other laws speciﬁc to CL (with
5“[Its] sense can be expressed (in metalogic) in the words: of any three sentences, two
must always be logically equivalent to each other. We can say that this thesis discredits
classical logic, as contrary to the common sense of the diversity of content (or sense)
of human speech, which Roman Suszko once emphasized. It is obvious that we can
not only indicate three sentences, the contents of which have no connection with each
other, but we can construct as many sentences as we want and guessing their mutual
entailment would be absurd.” ([10], p. 9-10).
6This example was indicated by Grzegorczyk in a private correspondence (in 2013).
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the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle at the front) are
generated by this logic.
The concept of description was deﬁned by Grzegorczyk relatively in-
dependently from the concept of synonymity. According to the above, it
is possible to determine the meaning of Necessary Descriptive Operators
in a system where the only constants are these operators. This raises the
question: what would this system be like? The following postulate provides
a totally natural response to this question.
Principle 4 (the principle of the truth nature of descriptions). The de-
scriptive meaning of negation, conjunction and disjunction connectives is
fully determined by CL.
At least two reasons favor supporting this postulate.
First, CL determines the purely truth meaning of these connectives.
This meaning is best described by the following way of reading them: “it
is not true that ...” (¬), “it is true that ... and it is true that ...” (∧)
and “at least one of two things is true: ... or ...” (∨). Every well-deﬁned
description is true or false, that is it has one of two logical values. CL
provides the simplest formalization of the concept of description, which
takes into account these basic epistemic values.
Second, CL determines the Boolean system of meanings of the con-
sidered operators, which is standard in modern logic, mathematics and
computer science. According to the commonly used in the sciences “prin-
ciple of conservatism”, the rejection of this standard would require strong
justiﬁcation. Such a justiﬁcation is not evident in the philosophical context
of the considered research project.
In particular, the strength of the arguments referring to the “paradoxi-
cal” statements such as (a) and (b) signiﬁcantly weaken when we give them
an appropriate reinterpretation according to their descriptive nature: ad
(a) of any three sentences, two always have the same truth value; ad (b)
at least one of two things is true: q or p ∨ ¬p. In a similar way, we can
minimize the counterintuitive sounding sentences (quoted at the beginning
of the previous section) with their truth-value reinterpretation: “It is true
that 2+2 = 4 iff it is true that Warsaw is on the Vistula”, “That 2+2 = 5
is true iff it is true that there are six empty sets”, and so on.
Grzegorczyk was sometimes inclined to recognize the principle of the
truth nature of descriptions. This assumption clearly proves that: “in the
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area of ¬, ∧ and ∨, quite important due to computer technology, Perceptive
Logic coincides with the classical logic” ([7], p. 450; the term “Perceptive
Logic” is used there to denote the logic of synonymity), as well as the
opinion that the operators of negation, conjunction and disjunction are
clearly deﬁned within CL (ibid., p. 446)7.
4. AE and logic of synonymity
According to the ﬁndings of [2] (p. 84) and [3], we denote by the symbol
“AE” (the smallest system of logic of analytical equivalence) which is the
smallest NFL system (i.e. system of the non-Fregean logic) closed under
the restricted quasi-Fregean rule:
(RQF)
α↔ β
α ≡ β
provided that At(α) = At(β)8.
The following basic fact occurs for the AE system.
Fact 3 (the analytic equivalence principle for AE, [3]). The following
equivalence is satisﬁed, for any α, β ∈ LSCI:
‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE iﬀ ‘α↔ β’ ∈ AE and At(α) = At(β).
Theorem 1. AE meets the principle 1-4.
Proof. Ad 1 and ad 4: obvious. Ad 2: the strong principle of exten-
sionality is a derived rule in SCI. All the more, its weak version is derived
rule in AE. Ad 3: according to the disjunctive normal form theorem for
classical logic, for any formula α of the language of this logic, there is a
formula β of this form such that ‘α ↔ β’ ∈ CL and α and β contain the
same variables. CL is a subsystem of SCI. Thus, under the RQF rule, the
formula ‘α ≡ β’ is the thesis of AE. 
7This opinion was also expressed, inter alia, in the description of this research project:
“In this project, we accept four basic connectives: three classical (underline A.B.) of
negation, conjunction and disjunction, and one new: the descriptive equivalence (aka
synonymity).” ([8], p. 5). The philosophical characterization of these operators given in
[10] (p. 3-4) is fully consistent with the truth-value characterization. What’s more, [9]
presented an outline of the matrix semantics for the so-called Extended Boolean Logic,
that is, for a certain CL extension by synonymity connective (this extension includes a
certain matrix for this connective).
8“At(α)” means the collection of all sentential variables occurring in α.
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In accord with the above theorem, the logic of analytical equivalence
is a version of the logic of synonymity according to Grzegorczyk.
The following theorem corresponds with this conclusion.
Theorem 2. LE is a subsystem of AE.
Proof. On the basis of the relevant theses of CL and the RQF rule, we
conclude that all the substitutions of (Ax0)LE−(Ax12)LE formulas are AE
theses. It is therefore suﬃcient to show that substitutions of the remaining
axioms are AE theses (Ax13)LE−(Ax17)LE , that is:
(a) α ≡ β) ≡ (β ≡ α),
(b) (α ≡ β) ≡ (¬α ≡ ¬β),
(c) ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ≡ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ≡ γ)),
(d) ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∧ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∧ γ)),
(e) ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ)).
1. ((α ≡ β)↔ (β ≡ α) SCI
2. ((α ≡ β) ≡ (β ≡ α) 1, RQF
3. (¬α ≡ ¬β)→ ((¬¬α ≡ ¬¬β) SCI
4. ¬¬β ≡ β CL, RQF
5. (¬α ≡ ¬β)→ (¬¬α ≡ β) 3, 4, SCI, CL
6. ¬¬α ≡ α CL, RQF
7. (¬α ≡ ¬β)→ (α ≡ β) 5, 6, SCI, CL
8. (α ≡ β)↔ (¬α ≡ ¬β) SCI, 7, Ext
9. (α ≡ β) ≡ (¬α ≡ ¬β) 8, RQF
10. ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ≡ γ))→ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ≡ γ)) CL, SCI
11 ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ≡ γ))→ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ≡ γ)) CL, SCI
12. ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ≡ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ≡ γ)) 10, 11, CL, RQF
13. ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ≡ γ))↔ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∧ γ)) CL, SCI
14. ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∧ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∧ γ)) 13, RQF
15. (α ≡ β)→ ((α ∨ γ))→ (β ∨ γ)) SCI, CL
16. (α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)→ (α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ)) 15, CL
17. (α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ))→ (α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)) CL, SCI
18. (α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)↔ (α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ) 16, 17, CL
19. ((α ≡ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)) ≡ ((α ≡ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ)) 18, RQF
Rules (∧1) and (∧2) are derived in CL and the MPLE rule is derived in
SCI. Thus, all the rules of LE apply to AE. 
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Taking into consideration that LE does not meet some Grzegorczyk’s
principles (in accord to Fact 2), the following conclusion may seem to be
interesting.
Theorem 3. AE is the smallest NFL system S containing LE that satisfies
Grzegorczyk’s principles 1-4 and the analytic equivalence principle:
‘α ≡ β’ ∈ S iff ‘α↔ β’ ∈ S and At(α) = At(β).
Proof. From Theorem 1, 2, Fact 3, and the fact that AE is the smallest
NFL system closed under the (RQF) rule. 
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